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Abstract
One of the longstanding puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall suciently in re
cessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment Put dierently if the competitive market
wage declines why dont employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as
well As an alternative to reviewing statistical data we have performed an experiment with
a lower competitive wage in the second phase of an employment relationship that is known
to both parties The experiment casts two subjects in the highly stylized roles of employer
and employee Our hypothesis is that employers will not lower wages correspondingly and
that employees will resist such wage cuts We nd at most mild evidence for resistance to
wage declines Instead the experimental results can be more fruitfully interpreted in terms
of an 	ultimatum game
 in which surplus between employers and employees is shared In
this view wages and their lack of decline are simply the mechanical tool for accomplishing
this split
  Introduction
One of the longstanding puzzles in economics is the question why wages do not fall suf
ciently in recessions so as to avoid the rises in unemployment
 
 Put dierently if the
competitive market wage declines why dont employers simply force their employees to
accept a lower wage as well As an alternative to reviewing statistical data we have per
formed an experiment with a lower competitive wage in the second phase of an employment
relationship that is known to both parties
Employment relationships as well as many other human relationships can either be op
portunistically terminated or be turned into longerterm relationships in which opportunism
is subordinated to other objectives In the case of labor relations an employer observing
a decline in the 
opportunity wage
 available to workers might try to increase prots by
cutting wages If the employee rejects the wage cut however he can impose a cost on the
employer although a replacement worker can be hired at the low competitive wage match
specic human capital accumulated in the former employee will be lost Our hypothesis is
that employers will not lower wages correspondingly i e that they do not adjust wages
according to market pressure and that employees would reject such wage cuts


Our experiment casts two subjects in highly stylized roles which can be readily inter
preted as employer and employee The experimental method allows us to confront decision
makers with welldened decision alternatives which are less clearly delineated in observable
employment relationships The tradeo is clear by concentrating on just a few features we
can analyze the gametheoretic situation with which experimental subjects are confronted
in ne detail but as a result we must be circumspect in our conclusions for actual labour
markets We have explicitly refrained from 
framing
 the experiment see Tversky and Kah
neman   as the labor market situation discussed above as this could induce behavior
which is determined by general political views rather than by the structural relationships
captured by our experimental situation
Our experiment concentrates on the 	microeconomics
 of the bargaining problem be
tween employers and employees as it is likely to be one of the key issues in resolving the
 
The question was probably rst posed by Keynes 	
 and has been most recently investigated em
pirically by Bewley 		 		  The debate in the empirical literature has advanced considerably in recent
decades so that we know that individual wages are procyclical even though the composition eect causes
aggregate wage indexes to be acyclical Bils 	 Solon et al  		  The question remains why dont
wages for some individuals decline suciently to clear the labor market 

Collard and de la Croix 		 uses this fair wage hypothesis to explain business cycle uctuations
in the context of the real business cycle framework  One can view the present paper as examining the
experimental microfoundations for this hypothesis 
 
	macroeconomic
 puzzle stated at the beginning One might conceive of an experiment
going all the way by actually embedding the microeconomic relationships into a fullblown
macroeconomic environment see eg Tietz   However this would require many more
and possibly contentious additional assumptions Since our focus is purely on the bargain
ing relationship between employers and employees we chose to abstract in our experimental
setting from general equilibrium eects
Labor market relationships have been analyzed experimentally elsewhere and most no
tably in Fehr Kirchsteiger and Riedl     and Fehr Gachter and Kirchsteiger  
 

 While this paper has been inuenced by this work we deviate from these authors
by treating the best outside alternative as the wage in an anonymous competitive labor
market The employer can hire somebody else who is actually not present in the experiment
and the employee can turn to another rm at the competitive wage even though that rm
is not present either One benecial side eect is that we do not have to generate 	market
clearing
 wages as part of the experimental design as a result far more independent data
points are generated with a given number of subjects
More importantly this paper focuses on a dierent question by modelling the employ
ment relationship as one in which the surplus can be destroyed to the disadvantage of both
parties by the singlehanded refusal of the employee to cooperate This unilateral refusal to
cooperate  ranging from withholding of eort to work slowdowns to strikes and sabotage
 is a wellknown response in industrial relations to wage reductions and forms the basis
for the 
fair wage
 literature see Akerlof and Yellen  a b Our experimental results
can be interpreted as an 	ultimatum game
 in which some surplus between employers and
employees is divided In this view wages and their exibility are simply the mechanical tool
for accomplishing this split Of course one could have imposed other eg more symmetric
rules of bargaining for instance the 
split the dierence
 approach of Nash   which
is sometimes employed to model wage formation see for example McDonaldSolow   
Oswald   Layard et al    Pissarides    or the elaborate microfoundations
proposed by Rubinstein   and Binmore et al  
Although wages are exible downward in our experimental results our empirical evidence
indicates some resistance to wage declines Although the ultimatum game has been studied
extensively with the rather robust nding that approximately  percent of the allocable
surplus is given to the second player

 we did not think of employment relationships as
representing ultimatum games initially Given our ndings it seems hard to avoid this

In contrast to these authors we do not investigate variation of eort in the spirit of the eciency wage
literature 

see Guth 		 and Roth 		 for recent surveys 

perspective and it is intriguing to speculate what this implies about actual labor markets
The paper is organized as follows Section  explains the experimental design Section 
contains some hypotheses Section  provides a descriptive analysis of our results whereas
section  contains a statistical analysis Section  concludes The appendix includes all the
documents used in conducting the experiment
 Experimental design
As already indicated in the introduction the experimental instructions were framed in non
suggestive neutral terms see Appendix A In the following we apply the notation described
there Let t      denote the period of interaction In both periods t      
employer

X rst proposes a nonnegative wage x
t
with an upper bound equal to the surplus S
t
in
period t which is known to both players 
Employee
 Y can reject this wage y
t
  or not
y
t
   Only in case of y
 
   does the relationship continue with period  The decision
y
t
  results in replacing the former employee by an anonymous substitute who works for
the competitive wage w
t
 but requires an additional investment C in human capital to be
paid by X This investment cost is nonrecoverable and has zero value at the end of the
game
The surplus S
t
and the competitive wage w
t
of periods t      were chosen as
w
 
    w

 
S
 
  S

 
ie from period   to period  the competitive wage declines while the dierence S
t
  w
t
remains constant The sole treatment variable is the investment cost C here two values were
chosen namely C   and

C    C represents the only structural threat of employee Y

 In case of C   we speak of no essential threat whereas

C    is assumed to represent
considerable threat

To sum up the earningsfunctions for the participants were given as
Xs action Y s action Xs payo Y s payo
x
 
y
 
    
x
 
  x

y
 
    y

    x
 
x
 
 
x
 
  x

y
 
    y

     x
 
  x

x
 
 x


Nonstructural threats could be contempt Y characterizes X as opportunistic or feelings of guilt X
condemns himself as an exploiter and the like 

From the perspective of the employer in the absence of strategic interaction this situation is identical
to one in which the competitive wage is respectively lower or higher in the second period  In the presence of
strategic interactions  as in this case  the role of C as a third party cost is of essential importance 

in case of C   wheras earnings in the

Ctreatment where given by
Xs action Y s action Xs payo Y s payo
x
 
y
 
    
x
 
  x

y
 
    y

    x
 
x
 
 
x
 
  x

y
 
    y

     x
 
  x

x
 
 x

These payments were made in German Marks or Dutch Guilders respectively
Our student participants received the instructions  identical for X and Y  after being
seated After reading the instructions asking for private clarication and lling out the
preexperimental questionnaire Appendix B the subjects were subdivided equally into an
X and a Y group Then the groups received their decision forms Appendix C and pro
ceeded as described by the sequential decision process Without announcing this beforehand
participants then repeated the game with new partners where  participants formed one
matching group but in the same position X or Y  Necessary feedback information was
provided according to the rules of the sequential decision process In doing so special care
was taken to preserve anonymity To save time all payments were made one week later
We conducted three experimental sessions with the same English instructions see Ap
pendix A one with  student participants registered for a macroeconomic course at the
University of Tilburg and two with  and  student participants of a macroeconomics un
dergraduate course at the HumboldtUniversity of Berlin An experimental session lasted on
average  minutes The Dutch subjects received on average  HFL whereas the German
subjects earned  DM on average
 Solution behavior and hypotheses
We rst describe the gametheoretic solution under payomaximization as a subgame perfect
equilibrium Selten   If period t   is actually reached employee Y should accept
any wage oer x

  ie not below the competitive wage w

  To avoid the cost of
retraining a new worker C employer X should therefore oer x
 

 
In period   similarly employee Y will accept all wage oers x
 
   ie not below the
competitive wage w
 
   in period   Thus the employerX should oer x
 
 
   in order to
avoid the positive cost C which results when Y has to be replaced Thus the gametheoretic
hypothesis for rational payomaximizing players is
Hypothesis   Employers o er competitive wages ie x
 
   and x

  and employees
accept all wages which do not fall below the competitive levels

A milder version of Hypothesis   which embodies the crucial behavior of wages adjusting
according to market pressure is
Hypothesis  The wage decline between the rst and second period equals the decline in
competitive wages ie x
 
  x

 
In the introduction we speculated that this hypothesis fails to hold and thus could
explain why wages do not adjust during recessions It is interesting that costs C do not
matter at all except for the fact that they are positive In gametheoretic terms the threat
of having to pay C does not inuence Xs behavior since X confronts Y with a takeitor
leaveit oer An alternative hypothesis is that agents behave dierently with Y rejecting
oers near competitive wage levels and X anticipating this in its initial oer This can be
summarized as follows
Hypothesis  Employees will reject o ers corresponding to the competitive wage levels and
employers will o er higher than competitive wages Wage o ers x
 
and x

as well as the
highest rejected wages will be higher for

C    than for C  
Hypothesis  has been made plausible by recent work in abstract bargaining experiments
see Roth   for a survey and more specic labor market experiments see Fehr et al
      which suggest that optimal takeitorleaveit oers x
 
 
   and x
 

  will
not be accepted If one wants someones approval here the reactions y
 
   and y

  
one had better oer a 
fair share

Our next hypothesis deals with the duration of an employment relationship Let P y
 

  denote the share of pairs X and Y of a matching group who cooperate in the rst period
making it to the second and P y
 
    y

   the share of pairsX and Y who also cooperate
in period  We postulate
Hypothesis  
P y
 
  y

 
P y
 
 
 P y
 
    
and
 x

  w

 x
 
  w
 
 
Part   of Hypothesis  means that a considerable share of pairs X and Y will choose a

commitment
 and that they are more eager to maintain that commitment continue the
relationship the longer it has lasted already Part  asserts a higher wage drift in the sense
of positive values x
t
  w
t
when relationships last longer In our view this would indicate

that relative disadvantages of one party eg the sharp decrease of the competitive wage
play a subordinate role in wage determination
One might explain part  of Hypothesis  also by the eect of cost C If Y is red already
in period t    employerX is compensated for his cost C by low competitive wages in both
periods whereas ring Y in period  means that costs can be recovered in period  only
To distinguish between the two interpretations of part  of Hypothesis  one could impose
the cost C for every period when a substitute worker is employed ie that X would have
to pay total training costs of
   y
 
C  y
 
   y

C
instead of
   y
 
C  y
 
   y

C
only
Our nal hypothesis comes from redening the experiment as an ultimatum game with a
surplus of C to be split between the employer and the employee In line with the experimental
results from the ultimatum game literature we formulate
Hypothesis  In successful matches the employee receives on average the competitive wage
plus forty percent of the surplus C whereas the employer keeps sixty percent of C on average
 Descriptive data analysis
What follows is a graphical summary of the results of the experiments We conducted a total
of three experiments the details of which can be found in the appendix Here we treat the
entire data as one sample
Figure   contains the results for wage declines in both treatments C and

C with C
shown at the top and

C shown at the bottom Hypothesis   would imply that the wage
decline should always be  the decline is usually lower than that although some wage
declines are dramatically larger Hypothesis  does not seem to be strongly violated by this
evidence apparently employers do by and large adjust wages according to market pressure
Figure  shows how much of the surplus the employee receives in successful matches
Note in particular that more surplus is paid to the employee in treatment

C as compared
to treatment C
Figure  shows the same data as gure  but in percent of the total surplus to be
distributed What is remarkable is that the surplus distributed in treatment C is reasonably

often below zero percent or above   percent In treatment

C the surplus distribution is
tighter In fact the distribution for treatment

C looks close to the distributions typically
found in experimental ultimatum games see our hypothesis 
Since the game was repeated once one can also control for experience eects In both
treatments there is a slight rise in the wage level x
 
from the rst to the second round from
   to   in treatment C and from  to   in treatment C which in view of the
large standard deviations do not qualify as reliable experience eects The average level of
x

decreases in treatment C from  to  and increases in treatment C from  
to  All acceptance rates ie shares of y
t
   increase with experience where the
acceptance increase of x

is with  to    to  for treatment C C
much clearer than of x
 
from  to   and from  to   for treatment C
repectively C
 Statistical analysis
In this section we provide some simple statistics related to our hypotheses Given the
graphical analysis above we concentrate on the analysis of hypothesis  to  The results
can be found in table   We nd that
  The rst claim of hypothesis  that employers oer wages above the competitive levels
is supported by the data for treatment

C the average surplus oered to the employee
is   with a standard deviation of  this allows to reject the null hypothesis of
an average oered surplus of zero at a ve percent signicance level with a onesided
test assuming normality For treatment C however the null of no surplus oered
in successful matches cannot be rejected Furthermore there is no support for the
part of hypothesis  which postulates that the oered rst period wages x
 
as well as
the rejected rst period wages will be higher if the costs C are higher Conducting a
robust rankorder test
	
a nochange hypothesis cannot be rejected at any conventional
signicance levelsThis holds for the individual observations of the rst round as well as
for the average of a matching group of the second round A dierent picture arises if we
look at the second period wages x

 A robust rankorder test reveals that the oered
wages as well as the rejected wages are signicantly higher in the high cost than in
the low cost treatment at a  level Again this holds for the individual observations
of the rst round as well as for the average of a matching group of the second round

For a description of this test see Siegel and Castellan 	 p   

Treatment C Treatment

C
Total matches  
of which unsuccessful y
 
  or y

    
of which y
 
     
Hypothesis 
oers rejected at stage   max     
mean  
std dev  
oers rejected at stage  max   
mean  
std dev  
Hypothesis 
Part  
P y
 
  y

 
P y
 
 
 
P y
 
    
Part  succ matches
x

  w

mean     
std dev    
x
 
  w
 
mean      
std dev   
Hypothesis 
successful matches
Aver surplus oered mean   
std dev  
in percent of C mean     
std dev  
Table   This table shows some summary statistics as well as statistics relevant for testing
some of the postulated hypotheses In calculating standard deviations we have not corrected
for the dependence of the observations within each group

accepted rejected total
treatment C
oers above equil   
oers at equil   
oers below equil    
treatment

C
oers above equil    
oers at equil   
oers below equil   
Table  This table shows the distribution of accepted and rejected o ers visavis the quality
of the o er For rst period rejections we used a rst period o er of x
 
   as equilibrium
whereas we used x
 
 x

   as equilibrium for games which reached the second period
Hence employment oers above the competitive wage mainly occured in the second
period of the high cost treatment Table  sheds further light on hypothesis  by
tabulating the acceptreject decisions visavis the quality of the oer
 For hypothesis  notice rst that in all matching groups at least one rst period
oer was accepted In the high cost treatment  of the rst period oers were
accepted and  in the low cost treatment Hence as stipulated by Hypothesis 
most pairs X and Y chose a 	commitment
 in the rst period However the claim
that
P y
 
  y

 
P y
 
 
 P y
 
   is not supported by the data on the basis of a Wilcoxon
signed rank test


equality cannot be rejected This holds for the low cost as well as
for the high cost treatment The claim that x

  w

 x
 
  w
 
is not supported in
case of the low cost treatment A Wilcoxon signed rank test

 reveals no dierence
In the high cost treatment however the dierence between the rstand the second
period wage drift is highly signicant Hence we can conclude that there is a positive
correlation between employment duration and wage drift but only if there is enough

surplus
 to divide
 Concerning hypothesis  one indeed cannot reject that the oered surplus is  percent
for both treatment C and treatment

C The standard error in treatment C is huge

For a description of this test see Siegel and Castellan 	 p   

For a description of this test see Siegel and Castellan 	 p   

less than        at least 
treatment C    
treatment

C     
Table  This table shows the percentage of the total surplus C which is received by the
worker in successful matches
though whereas it is much smaller for treatment

C a symmetric onestandard error
interval would be    ! for the surplus oered to the employee in percent The
evidence thus provides support to hypothesis  Table  sheds further light on this
hypothesis by examining the distribution of the total available surplus
The number of rejections  failure to reach an outcome in which there was positive
surplus to share  was signicant In both treatments the fraction of rejections were of
similar proportions with   for C and  for C Interestingly the fraction of total
failures occuring in the rst stage was signicantly higher in the low surplus case   a
result which merits further attention
 Conclusions
We wanted to explore experimentally whether and why wages do not seem to decline in
recessions to mitigate rises in unemployment Put dierently if the competitive market
wage declines why do employers not simply force their employees to accept lower wages
as well In our experiments the competitive wage in the second phase of an employment
relationship could already be anticipated by both parties so uncertainty over the best
available alternatives is nonexistent
 
Our hypothesis was that employers would not lower wages correspondingly and that
employees would reject such wage cuts We found at most mild evidence for resistance to
wage declines Wages appeared downward exible in treatments involving large costs to
noncooperation as well as in which these costs are relatively low
The experimental results can be interpreted as analogous to an 	ultimatum game
 in
which some surplus between employers and employees is split and wages and their lack
 	
Notice however that we could have easily avoided this by revealing in period  only the parameters S
 

w
 
and C and the total number of periods of interaction 
 
of decline are simply the mechanical tool for accomplishing this split A possible reason
for this result could be that we provided the conditions for perfect foresight as far as the
structural relationship is concerned Both partners knew that they will interact for at most
two periods and how the structural variables C
t
  w
t
 develop over time Thus a partnership
for the long race cannot be viewed as a risk sharing venture in which a lucky partner the
employer in the present case is supposed to help the unlucky one the employee
  
By
ruling out this insurance interpretation Rosen   Boldrin and Horvath   our study
can be regarded as a worst case scenario for testing our basic conjecture that wages will not
decline in recessions in contrast to the theory of competitive labor markets
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Figure   A histogram of declines of wages o ered between the rst and the second round
in successful matches Treatment C is the upper gure and treatment

C is the lower gure
According to 
pure theory found in hypothesis  the wage decline should be  The exper
imentally observed wage declines are often less but not by much Some wage declines are
dramatically larger
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Figure  A histogram of the surplus split between the employer and the employee shown is
the surplus paid to the employee Treatment C is the upper gure and treatment

C is the
lower gure Note that the total surplus is C   for treatment C and

C    for treatment

C
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Figure  A histogram of the surplus split between the employer and the employee shown is
the surplus paid to the employee in percent of the total surplus C Treatment C is the upper
gure and treatment

C is the lower gure Note that the total surplus is C   for treatment
C and

C    for treatment

C
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Appendix
A Instruction Sheets
 
A  Instruction sheet for for treatment C costs C  	
Instructions
In the experiment two parties each represented by one person called X and Y  are going
to interact Both X and Y  receive the same instructions Only before deciding you will
learn whether you are going to be X or Y  You will not learn from us with whom you will
be interacting We kindly ask you to refrain from any public remarks etc
How will X and Y interact The decision process is as follows
 First X chooses x
 
with   x
 
  ie x
 
cannot exceed  and must be non
negative
 Knowing the range   x
 
  for x
 
and the actual decision x
 
then Y can either
accept x
 
we denote this by y
 
   or not denoted by y
 
 
In case of y
 
  this is the end In case of y
 
  
 X again must choose namely x

with   x

 
 Knowing the range   x

  for x

and the actual decision x

then Y again can
accept x

denoted by y

   or not denoted by y

  After that the interaction
ends
How do decisions aect what the two parties X and Y earn This is described by the
following table
What What
X has done Y has done X earns Y earns
x
 
y
 
    
x
 
  x

y
 
    y

     x
 
x
 
 
x
 
  x

y
 
    y

      x
 
  x

x
 
 x

As you can see the maximum amount that X and Y together can earn is  That maximum
amount is reduced to  if y
 
  or y

 
Here the earnings are expressed in Dutch guilders H Since we need time to check your
earnings you can collect the money only a week later A code card will be attached to
your decision form You will have to show this when collecting your earnings
So you should keep it
These are the simple rules Please raise your hand if you did not understand something
We will try to answer your questions privately Do not ask loud questions and please refrain
from any communication Thank you for your cooperation#
How will we proceed After answering questions privately you will have to ll out a short
questionaire concerning the experiment We then proceed with the experiment exactly as
described in these instructions Enjoy the experiment#
 
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Instructions
In the experiment two parties each represented by one person called X and Y  are going
to interact Both X and Y  receive the same instructions Only before deciding you will
learn whether you are going to be X or Y  You will not learn from us with whom you will
be interacting We kindly ask you to refrain from any public remarks etc
How will X and Y interact The decision process is as follows
 First X chooses x
 
with   x
 
  ie x
 
cannot exceed  and must be non
negative
 Knowing the range   x
 
  for x
 
and the actual decision x
 
then Y can either
accept x
 
we denote this by y
 
   or not denoted by y
 
 
In case of y
 
  this is the end In case of y
 
  
 X again must choose namely x

with   x

 
 Knowing the range   x

  for x

and the actual decision x

then Y again can
accept x

denoted by y

   or not denoted by y

  After that the interaction
ends
How do decisions aect what the two parties X and Y earn This is described by the
following table
What What
X has done Y has done X earns Y earns
x
 
y
 
    
x
 
  x

y
 
    y

     x
 
x
 
 
x
 
  x

y
 
    y

      x
 
  x

x
 
 x

As you can see the maximum amount that X and Y together can earn is  That maximum
amount is reduced to  if y
 
  or y

 
Here the earnings are expressed in Dutch guilders H Since we need time to check your
earnings you can collect the money only a week later A code card will be attached to
your decision form You will have to show this when collecting your earnings
So you should keep it
These are the simple rules Please raise your hand if you did not understand something
We will try to answer your questions privately Do not ask loud questions and please refrain
from any communication Thank you for your cooperation#
How will we proceed After answering questions privately you will have to ll out a short
questionaire concerning the experiment We then proceed with the experiment exactly as
described in these instructions Enjoy the experiment#

B Questionaire
Code
Questionaire
Remember the range for x
 
is   x
 
  whereas for x

it is   x

  If X would
choose x
 
   and x

   what will X and Y earn under following assumptions for Y s
behavior
a x
 
and x

are accepted ie y
 
   and y

  
X earns Y earns
b x
 
is accepted x

not ie y
 
   and y

 
X earns Y earns
c x
 
and x

are rejected ie y
 
  X earns Y earns
Which of the two positions X or Y do you prefer I prefer position X or Y 
What would you do in case you were party X
As X I would choose x
 
   x
 
 
If x
 
would be accepted ie y
 
   I would choose x

   x

 
How would you react in case you were party Y 
As Y I would never reject any x
 
As Y I would reject some values x
 
In case of the latter please describe which values x
 
you would reject
              
As Y I would never reject any x

As Y I would reject some values x

In case of the latter please describe which values x

you would reject
           
 
C Decision Forms
Code
X Decision Form
I oer x
 
 only oers   x
 
  are possible
To be lled out by experimenter
Your oer x
 
is accepted y
 
  
Your oer is not accepted y
 
 
Only if x
 
is accepted please continue
I oer x

 only oers   x

  are possible
To be lled out by experimenter
Your oer x

is accepted
Your oer x

is not accepted
Please compute when ready I have earned

Code
Y  Decision Form
To be lled out by experimenter
X has oered x
 

I do not accept y
 
  the oer
I accept y
 
   the oer
To be lled out by experimenter
X has oered x


I do not accept y

  the oer
I accept y

   the oer
Please compute when ready I have earned

D Messenger Form
Messenger Form
Pair x

y

x
	
y
	

E Raw data
E  Experiment  February  Dutch economics students
E   Choices
Code Treat Grp Role No Round   Round  round Tot
ment x  y  x y x  y  x y    paym
AX   C   X                    
AX  C   X                   
AY  C   Y                     
AY  C   Y                    
AX  C  X                     
AX C  X                  
AY C  Y                      
AY C  Y                     
AX  C  X                   
AX C  X                 
AY C  Y                    
AY C  Y                    
BX  

C   X                   
BX 

C   X                    
BY 

C   Y                     
BY 

C   Y                     
BX 

C  X                  
BX

C  X                    
BY

C  Y                   
BY

C  Y                   
BX 

C  X                 
BX

C  X                 
BY

C  Y                  
BY

C  Y                   

E  Questionaire
Code aX Y bX Y cX Y I pre x  x never never
earns fer some some
AX            X     never never
AX           Y       
AY           X        
AY           X       
AX           X         
AX          X        
AY          X           
AY          X       
AX           X        
AX          Y        
AY          X   never never
AY          Y         
BX             Y        
BX            Y         
BY            X         
BY            Y   never x
BX            Y        x
 
 x

  
BX           Y        
BY           Y     never never
BY           X        
BX            Y        never
BX           X        
BY           b          
BY           X       

E  Experiment  May  Dutch law students
E  Choices
Code Treat Grp Role No Round   Round  round Tot
ment x  y  x y x  y  x y    paym
BX  

C   X               
BX 

C   X              
BY 

C   Y                  
BY 

C   Y           
E Questionaire
Code aX Y bX Y cX Y I pre x  x never never
earns fer some some
BX             X        never
BX            Y         
BY            X          
BY            X           

E  Experiment  June  German economics students
E  Choices
Code Tr Gr Rl $ Round   Round  round Tot
x  y  x y x  y  x y    paym
A X  C   X                   
A X C   X                    
A Y  C   Y                    
A Y C   Y                   
AX C  X                 
AX C  X                  
AY C  Y                    
AY C  Y                    
AX C  X             
AX C  X            
AY C  Y                 
AY C  Y          
AX C  X                 
AX C  X                  
AY C  Y                    
AY C  Y                    
AX C  X             
AX  C  X                  
AY C  Y                
AY  C  Y                     
AX   C  X               
AX  C  X         
AY   C  Y            
AY  C  Y                 
AX  C  X                
AX  C  X                    
AY  C  Y                      
AY  C  Y                  
AX  C  X               
AX  C  X                   
AY  C  Y                  
AY  C  Y                     
AX  C  X                   
AX  C  X                  
AY  C  Y                    
AY  C  Y                    
A X  C   X                    
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